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United States Patent5862260
RhoadsJanuary 19, 1999
Title
Methods for surveying dissemination of proprietary empirical data
Abstract
An automated system checks networked computers, such as computers on the internet, for watermarked audio, video, or image data. A report listing the location of such audio, video or image data is generated, and provided to the proprietor(s) thereof identified by the watermark information.
Inventors:Rhoads; Geoffrey B. (West Linn, OR)
Assignee:Digimarc Corporation (Lake Oswego, OR)
Appl. No.:649419
Filed:May 16, 1996
Current U.S. Class:382/232 
Field of Search:382/232,284 395/135 358/454,448,450,142,124 380/4,23,25,54 283/6,93,94 348/475 235/494
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Primary Examiner: Couso; Jose L.
Attorney, Agent or Firm:Klarquist Sparkman Campbell Leigh & Whinston, LLP
Parent Case Text


RELATED APPLICATION DATA

This application is a continuation in part of the following copending applications: PCT/US96/06618 (May 7, 1996), Ser. No. 08/637,531 (filed Apr. 25, 1996) allowed, Ser. No. 08/534,005 (filed Sep. 25, 1995) allowed, Ser. No. 08/598,083 (filed Jul. 27, 1995) pending, Ser. No. 08/436,102 (filed May 8, 1995) now U.S. Pat. No. 5,778,783, and Ser. No. 08/327,426 (filed Oct. 21, 1994) now U.S. Pat. No. 5,768,426. This later application is a continuation-in-part of Ser. No. 08/215,289 (filed Mar. 17, 1994), now abandoned, which is a continuation-in-part of Ser. No. 08/154,866 (filed Nov. 18, 1993), also abandoned. Priority is claimed to each of these prior applications.
Claims

I claim:
1. A method for surveying distribution of proprietary empirical data sets, such as audio, image, or video data, on computer sites accessible via the internet, comprising:
automatically downloading data, including empirical data sets, from a plurality of computer sites over the internet;
for each of a plurality of empirical data sets obtained by said downloading operation, automatically screening same to identify the potential presence of identification data steganographically encoded therein;
for each of a plurality of empirical data sets screened by said screening operation, discerning identification data, if any, steganographically encoded therein; and
generating a report identifying steganographically encoded empirical data sets identified by the foregoing steps, and the site from which each was downloaded;
wherein there is calibration data steganographically encoded within at least one empirical data set, said calibration data having one or more known properties facilitating identification thereof during the discerning step;
the method including identifying the calibration data within the empirical data set and using data obtained thereby to aid in discerning the identification data from the empirical data set;
wherein the empirical data set has been corrupted since being encoded, said corruption including a process selected from the group consisting of: misregistration and scaling of the empirical data set;
the method further including using said data to compensate for said corruption, wherein the identification data can nonetheless be recovered from the empirical data set notwithstanding said corruption.

2. The method of claim 1 which includes providing a master code signal, and using said code signal in discerning said steganographically encoded identification data from said screened empirical data sets.

3. The method of claim 2 in which said master code signal has the appearance of unpatterned snow if represented in the pixel domain.

4. The method of claim 1 in which said discerning of identification data from said downloaded empirical data is accomplished without previous knowledge of the audio, image, or video information represented thereby.

5. The method of claim 1 which includes identifying proprietors of empirical data sets by reference to identification data steganographically discerned therefrom, and reporting to said proprietors the sites from which their empirical data sets were downloaded.

6. The method of claim 5 in which said identification data includes information in addition to data identifying said proprietor, and the method includes providing said additional data to said proprietors.

7. The method of claim 5 in which said identification data is a serial number index into a registry database containing names and contact information for proprietors identified by said identification data.

8. The method of claim 1 in which the empirical data sets include image data, and the method includes:
converting said image data to pixel form, if not already in said form; and
performing a plurality of statistical analyses on said pixel form image data to discern the identification data therefrom.

9. The method of claim 8 in which each statistical analysis includes analyzing a collection of spaced apart pixels to decode a single, first bit of the identification data therefrom, said analysis to decode the first bit encompassing not just said spaced apart pixels, but also pixels adjacent thereto, said adjacent pixels not being encoded with said first bit.

10. A method for surveying distribution of proprietary empirical data sets on computer sites accessible via the internet, comprising:
providing a master code signal useful for detecting steganographic coding within empirical data sets;
automatically downloading data, including empirical data sets, from a plurality of computer sites over the internet;
for each of a plurality of empirical data sets obtained by said downloading operation, discerning certain identification data, if any, steganographically encoded therein, said discerning employing said master code signal as a decoding key; and
generating a report identifying steganographically encoded empirical data sets identified by the foregoing steps, and the site from which each was downloaded;
wherein there is calibration data steganographically encoded within at least one empirical data set, said calibration data having one or more known properties facilitating identification thereof during the discerning step;
the method including identifying the calibration data within the empirical data set and using data obtained thereby to aid in discerning the identification data from the empirical data set;
wherein the empirical data set has been corrupted since being encoded, said corruption including a process selected from the group consisting of: misregistration and scaling of the empirical data set;
the method further including using said data to compensate for said corruption, wherein the identification data can nonetheless be recovered from the empirical data set notwithstanding said corruption.

11. The method of claim 10 which includes automatically screening each of a plurality of said empirical data sets obtained by said downloading operation, to identify the potential presence of identification data steganographically encoded therein and, for those data sets that pass said screening process, discerning identification data, if any, steganographically encoded therein.

12. The method of claim 10 in which said master code signal has the appearance of unpatterned snow if represented in the pixel domain.

13. The method of claim 10 in which said discerning of identification data from said downloaded empirical data is accomplished without previous knowledge of the audio, image, or video information represented thereby.

14. The method of claim 10 which includes identifying proprietors of empirical data sets by reference to identification data steganographically discerned therefrom, and reporting to said proprietors the sites from which their empirical data sets were downloaded.

15. The method of claim 14 in which said identification data includes information in addition to data identifying said proprietor, and the method includes providing said additional data to said proprietors.

16. The method of claim 14 in which said identification data is a serial number index into a registry database containing names and contact information for proprietors identified by said identification data.

17. The method of claim 10 in which the empirical data sets include image data, and the method includes:
converting said image data to pixel form, if not already in said form; and
performing a plurality of statistical analyses on said pixel form image data to discern the identification data therefrom.

18. The method of claim 17 in which each statistical analysis includes analyzing a collection of spaced apart pixels to decode a single, first bit of the identification data therefrom, said analysis to decode the first bit encompassing not just said spaced apart pixels, but also pixels adjacent thereto, said adjacent pixels not being encoded with said first bit.
Description
BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Distribution of audio, imagery, graphics, and video on the internet is quick and simple. While advantageous in most respects, this ease of distribution makes it difficult for proprietors of such materials to track the uses to which their audio/imagery/graphics/video are put. It also allows such properties to be copied illicitly, in violation of the proprietors' copyrights.

The present invention seeks to redress these drawbacks by monitoring internet dissemination of various properties, and reporting the results back to their proprietors. If an unauthorized copy of a work is detected, appropriate steps can be taken to remove the copy, or compensate the proprietor accordingly.

In accordance with one method of the present invention, empirical data sets (e.g. audio, imagery, video) are downloaded from computer sites over the internet. Each of several data sets obtained in this fashion is automatically screened to identify the potential presence of steganographically encoded identification data. For these, the method discerns the encoded steganographically encoded identification data, if any, present in the data sets. A report is then generated, identifying the steganographically encoded empirical data sets, and the internet site from which each was downloaded.

The foregoing and other features and advantages of the present invention will be more readily apparent from the following detailed description, which proceeds with reference to the accompanying drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a simple and classic depiction of a one dimensional digital signal which is discretized in both axes.

FIG. 2 is a general overview, with detailed description of steps, of the process of embedding an "imperceptible" identification signal onto another signal.

FIG. 3 is a step-wise description of how a suspected copy of an original is identified.

FIG. 4 is a schematic view of an apparatus for pre-exposing film with identification information.

FIG. 5 is a diagram of a "black box" embodiment.

FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of the embodiment of FIG. 5.

FIG. 7 shows a variant of the FIG. 6 embodiment adapted to encode successive sets of input data with different code words but with the same noise data.

FIG. 8 shows a variant of the FIG. 6 embodiment adapted to encode each frame of a videotaped production with a unique code number.

FIGS. 9A-9C are representations of an industry standard noise second.

FIG. 10 shows an integrated circuit used in detecting standard noise codes.

FIG. 11 shows a process flow for detecting a standard noise code that can be used in the FIG. embodiment.

FIG. 12 is an embodiment employing a plurality of detectors.

FIG. 13 shows an embodiment in which a pseudo-random noise frame is generated from an image.

FIG. 14 illustrates how statistics of a signal can be used in aid of decoding.

FIG. 15 shows how a signature signal can be preprocessed to increase its robustness in view of anticipated distortion, e.g. MPEG.

FIGS. 16 and 17 show embodiments in which information about a file is detailed both in a header, and in the file itself.

FIGS. 18-20 show details relating to embodiments using rotationally symmetric patterns.

FIGS. 21A and 21B show encoding "bumps" rather than pixels.

FIGS. 22-26 detail aspects of a security card.

FIG. 27 is a diagram illustrating a network linking method using information embedded in data objects that have inherent noise.

FIGS. 27A and 27B show a typical web page, and a step in its encapsulation into a self extracting web page object.

FIG. 28 is a diagram of a photographic identification document or security card.

FIGS. 29 and 30 illustrate two embodiments by which subliminal digital graticules can be realized.

FIG. 29A shows a variation on the FIG. 29 embodiment.

FIGS. 31A and 31B show the phase of spatial frequencies along two inclined axes.

FIGS. 32A-32C show the phase of spatial frequencies along first, second and third concentric rings.

FIGS. 33A-33E show steps in the registration process for a subliminal graticule using inclined axes.

FIGS. 34A-34E show steps in the registration process for a subliminal graticule using concentric rings.

FIGS. 35A-35C shows further steps in the registration process for a subliminal graticule using inclined axes.

FIGS. 36A-36D show another registration process that does not require a 2D FFT.

FIG. 37 is a flow chart summarizing a registration process for subliminal graticules.

FIG. 38 is a block diagram showing principal components of an exemplary wireless telephony system.

FIG. 39 is a block diagram of an exemplary steganographic encoder that can be used in the telephone of the FIG. 38 system.

FIG. 40 is a block diagram of an exemplary steganographic decoder that can be used in the cell site of the FIG. 1 system.

FIGS. 41A and 41B show exemplary bit cells used in one form of encoding.

FIG. 42 shows a hierarchical arrangement of signature blocks, sub-blocks, and bit cells used in one embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following discussion of an illustrative embodiment, the words "signal" and "image" are used interchangeably to refer to both one, two, and even beyond two dimensions of digital signal. Examples will routinely switch back and forth between a one dimensional audio-type digital signal and a two dimensional image-type digital signal.

In order to fully describe the details of an illustrative embodiment, it is necessary first to describe the basic properties of a digital signal. FIG. 1 shows a classic representation of a one dimensional digital signal. The x-axis defines the index numbers of sequence of digital "samples," and the y-axis is the instantaneous value of the signal at that sample, being constrained to exist only at a finite number of levels defined as the "binary depth" of a digital sample. The example depicted in FIG. 1 has the value of 2 to the fourth power, or "4 bits," giving 16 allowed states of the sample value.

For audio information such as sound waves, it is commonly accepted that the digitization process discretizes a continuous phenomena both in the time domain and in the signal level domain. As such, the process of digitization itself introduces a fundamental error source, in that it cannot record detail smaller than the discretization interval in either domain. The industry has referred to this, among other ways, as "aliasing" in the time domain, and "quantization noise" in the signal level domain. Thus, there will always be a basic error floor of a digital signal. Pure quantization noise, measured in a root mean square sense, is theoretically known to have the value of one over the square root of twelve, or about 0.29 DN, where DN stands for `Digital Number` or the finest unit increment of the signal level. For example, a perfect 12-bit digitizer will have 4096 allowed DN with an innate root mean square noise floor of .about.0.29 DN.

All known physical measurement processes add additional noise to the transformation of a continuous signal into the digital form. The quantization noise typically adds in quadrature (square root of the mean squares) to the "analog noise" of the measurement process, as it is sometimes referred to.

With almost all commercial and technical processes, the use of the decibel scale is used as a measure of signal and noise in a given recording medium. The expression "signal-to-noise ratio" is generally used, as it will be in this disclosure. As an example, this disclosure refers to signal to noise ratios in terms of signal power and noise power, thus 20 dB represents a 10 times increase in signal amplitude.

In summary, this embodiment embeds an N-bit value onto an entire signal through the addition of a very low amplitude encodation signal which has the look of pure noise. N is usually at least 8 and is capped on the higher end by ultimate signal-to-noise considerations and "bit error" in retrieving and decoding the N-bit value. As a practical matter, N is chosen based on application specific considerations, such as the number of unique different "signatures" that are desired. To illustrate, if N=128, then the number of unique digital signatures is in excess of 10 38(2 128). This number is believed to be more than adequate to both identify the material with sufficient statistical certainty and to index exact sale and distribution information.

The amplitude or power of this added signal is determined by the aesthetic and informational considerations of each and every application using the present methodology. For instance, non-professional video can stand to have a higher embedded signal level without becoming noticeable to the average human eye, while high precision audio may only be able to accept a relatively small signal level lest the human ear perceive an objectionable increase in "hiss." These statements are generalities and each application has its own set of criteria in choosing the signal level of the embedded identification signal. The higher the level of embedded signal, the more corrupted a copy can be and still be identified. On the other hand, the higher the level of embedded signal, the more objectionable the perceived noise might be, potentially impacting the value of the distributed material.

To illustrate the range of different applications to which applicant's technology can be applied, the present specification details two different systems. The first (termed, for lack of a better name, a "batch encoding" system), applies identification coding to an existing data signal. The second (termed, for lack of a better name, a "real time encoding" system), applies identification coding to a signal as it is produced. Those skilled in the art will recognize that the principles of applicant's technology can be applied in a number of other contexts in addition to these particularly described.

The discussions of these two systems can be read in either order. Some readers may find the latter more intuitive than the former; for others the contrary may be true.

Batch Encoding

The following discussion of a first class of embodiments is best prefaced by a section defining relevant terms:

The original signal refers to either the original digital signal or the high quality digitized copy of a non-digital original.

The N-bit identification word refers to a unique identification binary value, typically having N range anywhere from 8 to 128, which is the identification code ultimately placed onto the original signal via the disclosed transformation process. In the illustrated embodiment, each N-bit identification word begins with the sequence of values `0101,` which is used to determine an optimization of the signal-to-noise ratio in the identification procedure of a suspect signal (see definition below).

The m'th bit value of the N-bit identification word is either a zero or one corresponding to the value of the m'th place, reading left to right, of the N-bit word. E.g., the first (m=1) bit value of the N=8 identification word 01110100 is the value `0;` the second bit value of this identification word is `1`, etc.

The m'th individual embedded code signal refers to a signal which has dimensions and extent precisely equal to the original signal (e.g. both are a 512 by 512 digital image), and which is (in the illustrated embodiment) an independent pseudo-random sequence of digital values. "Pseudo" pays homage to the difficulty in philosophically defining pure randomness, and also indicates that there are various acceptable ways of generating the "random" signal. There will be exactly N individual embedded code signals associated with any given original signal.

The acceptable perceived noise level refers to an application-specific determination of how much "extra noise," i.e. amplitude of the composite embedded code signal described next, can be added to the original signal and still have an acceptable signal to sell or otherwise distribute. This disclosure uses a 1 dB increase in noise as a typical value which might be acceptable, but this is quite arbitrary.

The composite embedded code signal refers to the signal which has dimensions and extent precisely equal to the original signal, (e.g. both are a 512 by 512 digital image), and which contains the addition and appropriate attenuation of the N individual embedded code signals. The individual embedded signals are generated on an arbitrary scale, whereas the amplitude of the composite signal must not exceed the pre-set acceptable perceived noise level, hence the need for "attenuation" of the N added individual code signals.

The distributable signal refers to the nearly similar copy of the original signal, consisting of the original signal plus the composite embedded code signal. This is the signal which is distributed to the outside community, having only slightly higher but acceptable "noise properties" than the original.

A suspect signal refers to a signal which has the general appearance of the original and distributed signal and whose potential identification match to the original is being questioned. The suspect signal is then analyzed to see if it matches the N-bit identification word.

The detailed methodology of this first embodiment begins by stating that the N-bit identification word is encoded onto the original signal by having each of the m bit values multiply their corresponding individual embedded code signals, the resultant being accumulated in the composite signal, the fully summed composite signal then being attenuated down to the acceptable perceived noise amplitude, and the resultant composite signal added to the original to become the distributable signal.

The original signal, the N-bit identification word, and all N individual embedded code signals are then stored away in a secured place. A suspect signal is then found. This signal may have undergone multiple copies, compressions and decompressions, resamplings onto different spaced digital signals, transfers from digital to analog back to digital media, or any combination of these items. IF the signal still appears similar to the original, i.e. its innate quality is not thoroughly destroyed by all of these transformations and noise additions, then depending on the signal to noise properties of the embedded signal, the identification process should function to some objective degree of statistical confidence. The extent of corruption of the suspect signal and the original acceptable perceived noise level are two key parameters in determining an expected confidence level of identification.

The identification process on the suspected signal begins by resampling and aligning the suspected signal onto the digital format and extent of the original signal. Thus, if an image has been reduced by a factor of two, it needs to be digitally enlarged by that same factor. Likewise, if a piece of music has been "cut out," but may still have the same sampling rate as the original, it is necessary to register this cut-out piece to the original, typically done by performing a local digital cross-correlation of the two signals (a common digital operation), finding at what delay value the correlation peaks, then using this found delay value to register the cut piece to a segment of the original.

Once the suspect signal has been sample-spacing matched and registered to the original, the signal levels of the suspect signal should he matched in an rms sense to the signal level of the original. This can be done via a search on the parameters of offset, amplification, and gamma being optimized by using the minimum of the mean squared error between the two signals as a function of the three parameters. We can call the suspect signal normalized and registered at this point, or just normalized for convenience.

The newly matched pair then has the original signal subtracted from the normalized suspect signal to produce a difference signal. The difference signal is then cross-correlated with each of the N individual embedded code signals and the peak cross-correlation value recorded. The first four bit code (`0101`) is used as a calibrator both on the mean values of the zero value and the one value, and on further registration of the two signals if a finer signal to noise ratio is desired (i.e., the optimal separation of the 0101 signal will indicate an optimal registration of the two signals and will also indicate the probable existence of the N-bit identification signal being present.)

The resulting peak cross-correlation values will form a noisy series of floating point numbers which can be transformed into 0's and 1's by their proximity to the mean values of 0 and 1 found by the 0101 calibration sequence. If the suspect signal has indeed been derived from the original, the identification number resulting from the above process will match the N-bit identification word of the original, bearing in mind either predicted or unknown "bit error" statistics. Signal-to-noise considerations will determine if there will be some kind of "bit error" in the identification process, leading to a form of X% probability of identification where X might be desired to be 99.9% or whatever. If the suspect copy is indeed not a copy of the original, an essentially random sequence of 0's and 1's will be produced, as well as an apparent lack of separation of the resultant values. This is to say, if the resultant values are plotted on a histogram, the existence of the N-bit identification signal will exhibit strong bi-level characteristics, whereas the non-existence of the code, or the existence of a different code of a different original, will exhibit a type of random gaussian-like distribution. This histogram separation alone should be sufficient for an identification, but it is even stronger proof of identification when an exact binary sequence can be objectively reproduced.

Specific Example

Imagine that we have taken a valuable picture of two heads of state at a cocktail party, pictures which are sure to earn some reasonable fee in the commercial market. We desire to sell this picture and ensure that it is not used in an unauthorized or uncompensated manner. This and the following steps are summarized in FIG. 2.

Assume the picture is transformed into a positive color print. We first scan this into a digitized form via a normal high quality black and white scanner with a typical photometric spectral response curve. (It is possible to get better ultimate signal to noise ratios by scanning in each of the three primary colors of the color image, but this nuance is not central to describing the basic process.)

Let us assume that the scanned image now becomes a 4000 by 4000 pixel monochrome digital image with a grey scale accuracy defmed by 12-bit grey values or 4096 allowed levels. We will call this the "original digital image" realizing that this is the same as our "original signal" in the above definitions.

During the scanning process we have arbitrarily set absolute black to correspond to digital value `30`. We estimate that there is a basic 2 Digital Number root mean square noise existing on the original digital image, plus a theoretical noise (known in the industry as "shot noise") of the square root of the brightness value of any given pixel. In formula, we have:

Here, n and m are simple indexing values on rows and columns of the image ranging from 0 to 3999. Sqrt is the square root. V is the DN of a given indexed pixel on the original digital image. The < >brackets around the RMS noise merely indicates that this is an expected average value, where it is clear that each and every pixel will have a random error individually. Thus, for a pixel value having 1200 as a digital number or "brightness value", we find that its expected rms noise value is sqrt(1204)=34.70, which is quite close to 34.64, the square root of 1200.

We furthermore realize that the square root of the innate brightness value of a pixel is not precisely what the eye perceives as a minimum objectionable noise, thus we come up with the formula:

Where X and Y have been added as empirical parameters which we will adjust, and "addable" noise refers to our acceptable perceived noise level from the definitions above. We now intend to experiment with what exact value of X and Y we can choose, but we will do so at the same time that we are performing the next steps in the process.

The next step in our process is to choose N of our N-bit identification word. We decide that a 16 bit main identification value with its 65536 possible values will be sufficiently large to identify the image as ours, and that we will be directly selling no more than 128 copies of the image which we wish to track, giving 7 bits plus an eighth bit for an odd/even adding of the first 7 bits (i.e. an error checking bit on the first seven). The total bits required now are at 4 bits for the 0101
calibration sequence, 16 for the main identification, 8 for the version, and we now throw in another 4 as a further error checking value on the first 28 bits, giving 32 bits as N. The final 4 bits can use one of many industry standard error checking methods to choose its four values.

We now randomly determine the 16 bit main identification number, finding for example, 1101 0001 1001 1110; our first versions of the original sold will have all 0's as the version identifier, and the error checking bits will fall out where they may. We now have our unique 32 bit identification word which we will embed on the original digital image.

To do this, we generate 32 independent random 4000 by 4000 encoding images for each bit of our 32 bit identification word. The manner of generating these random images is revealing. There are numerous ways to generate these. By far the simplest is to turn up the gain on the same scanner that was used to scan in the original photograph, only this time placing a pure black image as the input, then scanning this 32 times. The only drawback to this technique is that it does require a large amount of memory and that "fixed pattern" noise will be part of each independent "noise image." But, the fixed pattern noise can be removed via normal "dark frame" subtraction techniques. Assume that we set the absolute black average value at digital number `100,` and that rather than finding a 2 DN rms noise as we did in the normal gain setting, we now find an rms noise of 10 DN about each and every pixel's mean value.

We next apply a mid-spatial-frequency bandpass filter (spatial convolution) to each and every independent random image, essentially removing the very high and the very low spatial frequencies from them. We remove the very low frequencies because simple real-world error sources like geometrical warping, splotches on scanners, mis-registrations, and the like will exhibit themselves most at lower frequencies also, and so we want to concentrate our identification signal at higher spatial frequencies in order to avoid these types of corruptions. Likewise, we remove the higher frequencies because multiple generation copies of a given image, as well as compression-decompression transformations, tend to wipe out higher frequencies anyway, so there is no point in placing too much identification signal into these frequencies if they will be the ones most prone to being attenuated. Therefore, our new filtered independent noise images will be dominated by mid-spatial frequencies. On a practical note, since we are using 12-bit values on our scanner and we have removed the DC value effectively and our new rms noise will be slightly less than 10 digital numbers, it is useful to boil this down to a 6-bit value ranging from -32 through 0 to 31 as the resultant random image.

Next we add all of the random images together which have a `1` in their corresponding bit value of the 32-bit identification word, accumulating the result in a 16-bit signed integer image. This is the unattenuated and un-scaled version of the composite embedded signal.

Next we experiment visually with adding the composite embedded signal to the original digital image, through varying the X and Y parameters of equation 2. In formula, we visually iterate to both maximize X and to find the appropriate Y in the following:

where dist refers to the candidate distributable image, i.e. we are visually iterating to find what X and Y will give us an acceptable image; orig refers to the pixel value of the original image; and comp refers to the pixel value of the composite image. The n's and m's still index rows and columns of the image and indicate that this operation is done on all 4000 by 4000 pixels. The symbol V is the DN of a given pixel and a given image.

As an arbitrary assumption, now, we assume that our visual experimentation has found that the value of X=0.025 and Y=0.6 are acceptable values when comparing the original image with the candidate distributable image. This is to say, the distributable image with the "extra noise" is acceptably close to the original in an aesthetic sense. Note that since our individual random images had a random rms noise value around 10 DN, and that adding approximately 16 of these images together will increase the composite noise to around 40 DN, the X multiplication value of 0.025 will bring the added rms noise back to around 1 DN, or half the amplitude of our innate noise on the original. This is roughly a 1 dB gain in noise at the dark pixel values and correspondingly more at the brighter values modified by the Y value of 0.6.

So with these two values of X and Y, we now have constructed our first versions of a distributable copy of the original. Other versions will merely create a new composite signal and possibly change the X slightly if deemed necessary. We now lock up the original digital image along with the 32-bit identification word for each version, and the 32 independent random 4-bit images, waiting for our first case of a suspected piracy of our original. Storage wise, this is about 14 Megabytes for the original image and 32*0.5 bytes*16 million=.about.256 Megabytes for the random individual encoded images. This is quite acceptable for a single valuable image. Some storage economy can be gained by simple lossless compression.

Finding a Suspected Piracy of our Image

We sell our image and several months later find our two heads of state in the exact poses we sold them in, seemingly cut and lifted out of our image and placed into another stylized background scene. This new "suspect" image is being printed in
100,000 copies of a given magazine issue, let us say. We now go about determining if a portion of our original image has indeed been used in an unauthorized manner. FIG. 3 summarizes the details.

The first step is to take an issue of the magazine, cut out the page with the image on it, then carefully but not too carefully cut out the two figures from the background image using ordinary scissors. If possible, we will cut out only one connected piece rather than the two figures separately. We paste this onto a black background and scan this into a digital form. Next we electronically flag or mask out the black background, which is easy to do by visual inspection.

We now procure the original digital image from our secured place along with the 32-bit identification word and the 32 individual embedded images. We place the original digital image onto our computer screen using standard image manipulation software, and we roughly cut along the same borders as our masked area of the suspect image, masking this image at the same time in roughly the same manner. The word `roughly` is used since an exact cutting is not needed, it merely aids the identification statistics to get it reasonably close.

Next we rescale the masked suspect image to roughly match the size of our masked original digital image, that is, we digitally scale up or down the suspect image and roughly overlay it on the original image. Once we have performed this rough registration, we then throw the two images into an automated scaling and registration program. The program performs a search on the three parameters of x position, y position, and spatial scale, with the figure of merit being the mean squared error between the two images given any given scale variable and x and y offset. This is a fairly standard image processing methodology. Typically this would be done using generally smooth interpolation techniques and done to sub-pixel accuracy. The search method can be one of many, where the simplex method is a typical one.

Once the optimal scaling and x-y position variables are found, next comes another search on optimizing the black level, brightness gain, and gamma of the two images. Again, the figure of merit to be used is mean squared error, and again the simplex or other search methodologies can be used to optimize the three variables. After these three variables are optimized, we apply their corrections to the suspect image and align it to exactly the pixel spacing and masking of the original digital image and its mask. We can now call this the standard mask.

The next step is to subtract the original digital image from the newly normalized suspect image only within the standard mask region. This new image is called the difference image.

Then we step through all 32 individual random embedded images, doing a local cross-correlation between the masked difference image and the masked individual embedded image. `Local` refers to the idea that one need only start correlating over an offset region of .+-.1 pixels of offset between the nominal registration points of the two images found during the search procedures above. The peak correlation should be very close to the nominal registration point of 0,0 offset, and we can add the 3
by 3 correlation values together to give one grand correlation value for each of the 32 individual bits of our 32-bit identification word.

After doing this for all 32 bit places and their corresponding random images, we have a quasi-floating point sequence of 32 values. The first four values represent our calibration signal of 0101. We now take the mean of the first and third floating point value and call this floating point value `0,` and we take the mean of the second and the fourth value and call this floating point value `1.` We then step through all remaining 28 bit values and assign either a `0` or a `1` based simply on which mean value they are closer to. Stated simply, if the suspect image is indeed a copy of our original, the embedded 32-bit resulting code should match that of our records, and if it is not a copy, we should get general randomness. The third and the fourth possibilities of 3) Is a copy but doesn't match identification number and 4) isn't a copy but does match are, in the case of 3), possible if the signal to noise ratio of the process has plummeted, i.e. the `suspect image` is truly a very poor copy of the original, and in the case of 4) is basically one chance in four billion since we were using a 32-bit identification number. If we are truly worried about 4), we can just have a second independent lab perform their own tests on a different issue of the same magazine. Finally, checking the error-check bits against what the values give is one final and possibly overkill check on the whole process. In situations where signal to noise is a possible problem, these error checking bits might be eliminated without too much harm.

Benefits

Now that a full description of the first embodiment has been described via a detailed example, it is appropriate to point out the rationale of some of the process steps and their benefits.

The ultimate benefits of the foregoing process are that obtaining an identification number is fully independent of the manners and methods of preparing the difference image. That is to say, the manners of preparing the difference image, such as cutting, registering, scaling, etcetera, cannot increase the odds of finding an identification number when none exists; it only helps the signal-to-noise ratio of the identification process when a true identification number is present. Methods of preparing images for identification can be different from each other even, providing the possibility for multiple independent methodologies for making a match.

The ability to obtain a match even on sub-sets of the original signal or image is a key point in today's information-rich world. Cutting and pasting both images and sound clips is becoming more common, allowing such an embodiment to be used in detecting a copy even when original material has been thus corrupted. Finally, the signal to noise ratio of matching should begin to become difficult only when the copy material itself has been significantly altered either by noise or by significant distortion; both of these also will affect that copy's commercial value, so that trying to thwart the system can only be done at the expense of a huge decrease in commercial value.

An early conception of this technology was the case where only a single "snowy image" or random signal was added to an original image, i.e. the case where N=1. "Decoding" this signal would involve a subsequent mathematical analysis using (generally statistical) algorithms to make a judgment on the presence or absence of this signal. The reason this approach was abandoned as the preferred embodiment was that there was an inherent gray area in the certainty of detecting the presence or absence of the signal. By moving onward to a multitude of bit planes, i.e. N >1, combined with simple pre-defined algorithms prescribing the manner of choosing between a "0" and a "1", the certainty question moved from the realm of expert statistical analysis into the realm of guessing a random binary event such as a coin flip. This is seen as a powerful feature relative to the intuitive acceptance of this technology in both the courtroom and the marketplace. The analogy which summarizes the inventor's thoughts on this whole question is as follows: The search for a single identification signal amounts to calling a coin flip only once, and relying on arcane experts to make the call; whereas the N>1 embodiment relies on the broadly intuitive principle of correctly calling a coin flip N times in a row. This situation is greatly exacerbated, i.e. the problems of "interpretation" of the presence of a single signal, when images and sound clips get smaller and smaller in extent.

Another important reason that the N>1 case is preferred over the N=1 embodiment is that in the N=1 case, the manner in which a suspect image is prepared and manipulated has a direct bearing on the likelihood of making a positive identification. Thus, the manner with which an expert makes an identification determination becomes an integral part of that determination. The existence of a multitude of mathematical and statistical approaches to making this determination leave open the possibility that some tests might make positive identifications while others might make negative determinations, inviting further arcane debate about the relative merits of the various identification approaches. The N>1 embodiment avoids this further gray area by presenting a method where no amount of pre-processing of a signal--other than pre-processing which surreptitiously uses knowledge of the private code signals--can increase the likelihood of "calling the coin flip N times in a row."

The fullest expression of the present system will come when it becomes an industry standard and numerous independent groups set up with their own means or `in-house` brand of applying embedded identification numbers and in their decipherment. Numerous independent group identification will further enhance the ultimate objectivity of the method, thereby enhancing its appeal as an industry standard.

Use of True Polarity in Creating the Composite Embedded Code Signal

The foregoing discussion made use of the 0 and 1 formalism of binary technology to accomplish its ends. Specifically, the 0's and 1's of the N-bit identification word directly multiplied their corresponding individual embedded code signal to form the composite embedded code signal (step 8, FIG. 2). This approach certainly has its conceptual simplicity, but the multiplication of an embedded code signal by 0 along with the storage of that embedded code contains a kind of inefficiency.

It is preferred to maintain the formalism of the 0 and 1 nature of the N-bit identification word, but to have the 0's of the word induce a subtraction of their corresponding embedded code signal. Thus, in step 8 of FIG. 2, rather than only `adding` the individual embedded code signals which correspond to a `1` in the N-bit identification word, we will also `subtract` the individual embedded code signals which correspond to a `0` in the N-bit identification word.

At first glance this seems to add more apparent noise to the final composite signal. But it also increases the energy-wise separation of the 0's from the 1's, and thus the `gain` which is applied in step 10, FIG. 2 can be correspondingly lower.

We can refer to this improvement as the use of true polarity. The main advantage of this improvement can largely be summarized as `informational efficiency.`

`Perceptual Orthogonality` of the Individual Embedded Code Signals

The foregoing discussion contemplates the use of generally random noise-like signals as the individual embedded code signals. This is perhaps the simplest form of signal to generate. However, there is a form of informational optimization which can be applied to the set of the individual embedded signals, which the applicant describes under the rubric `perceptual orthogonality.` This term is loosely based on the mathematical concept of the orthogonality of vectors, with the current additional requirement that this orthogonality should maximize the signal energy of the identification information while maintaining it below some perceptibility threshold. Put another way, the embedded code signals need not necessarily be random in nature.

Use and Improvements of the First Embodiment in the Field of Emulsion-Based Photography

The foregoing discussion outlined techniques that are applicable to photographic materials. The following section explores the details of this area further and discloses certain improvements which lend themselves to a broad range of applications.

The first area to be discussed involves the pre-application or pre-exposing of a serial number onto traditional photographic products, such as negative film, print paper, transparencies, etc. In general, this is a way to embed a priori unique serial numbers (and by implication, ownership and tracking information) into photographic material. The serial numbers themselves would be a permanent part of the normally exposed picture, as opposed to being relegated to the margins or stamped on the back of a printed photograph, which all require separate locations and separate methods of copying. The `serial number` as it is called here is generally synonymous with the N-bit identification word, only now we are using a more common industrial terminology.

In FIG. 2, step 11, the disclosure calls for the storage of the "original [image]" along with code images. Then in FIG. 3, step 9, it directs that the original be subtracted from the suspect image, thereby leaving the possible identification codes plus whatever noise and corruption has accumulated. Therefore, the previous disclosure made the tacit assumption that there exists an original without the composite embedded signals.

Now in the case of selling print paper and other duplication film products, this will still be the case, i.e., an "original" without the embedded codes will indeed exist and the basic methodology of the first embodiment can be employed. The original film serves perfectly well as an `unencoded original.`

However, in the case where pre-exposed negative film is used, the composite embedded signal pre-exists on the original film and thus there will never be an "original" separate from the pre-embedded signal. It is this latter case, therefore, which will be examined a bit more closely, along with observations on how to best use the principles discussed above (the former cases adhering to the previously outlined methods).

The clearest point of departure for the case of pre-numbered negative film, i.e. negative film which has had each and every frame pre-exposed with a very faint and unique composite embedded signal, comes at step 9 of FIG. 3 as previously noted. There are certainly other differences as well, but they are mostly logistical in nature, such as how and when to embed the signals on the film, how to store the code numbers and serial number, etc. Obviously the pre-exposing of film would involve a major change to the general mass production process of creating and packaging film.

FIG. 4 has a schematic outlining one potential post-hoc mechanism for pre-exposing film. `Post-hoc` refers to applying a process after the full common manufacturing process of film has already taken place. Eventually, economies of scale may dictate placing this pre-exposing process directly into the chain of manufacturing film. Depicted in FIG. 4 is what is commonly known as a film writing system. The computer, 106, displays the composite signal produced in step 8, FIG. 2, on its phosphor screen. A given frame of film is then exposed by imaging this phosphor screen, where the exposure level is generally very faint, i.e. generally imperceptible. Clearly, the marketplace will set its own demands on how faint this should be, that is, the level of added `graininess` as practitioners would put it. Each frame of film is sequentially exposed, where in general the composite image displayed on the CRT 102 is changed for each and every frame, thereby giving each frame of film a different serial number. The transfer lens 104 highlights the focal conjugate planes of a film frame and the CRT face.

Getting back to the applying the principles of the foregoing embodiment in the case of pre-exposed negative film . . . At step 9, FIG. 3, if we were to subtract the "original" with its embedded code, we would obviously be "erasing" the code as well since the code is an integral part of the original. Fortunately, remedies do exist and identifications can still be made. However, it will be a challenge to artisans who refine this embodiment to have the signal to noise ratio of the identification process in the pre-exposed negative case approach the signal to noise ratio of the case where the un-encoded original exists.

A succinct definition of the problem is in order at this point. Given a suspect picture (signal), find the embedded identification code IF a code exists at al. The problem reduces to one of finding the amplitude of each and every individual embedded code signal within the suspect picture, not only within the context of noise and corruption as was previously explained, but now also within the context of the coupling between a captured image and the codes. `Coupling` here refers to the idea that the captured image "randomly biases" the cross-correlation.

So, bearing in mind this additional item of signal coupling, the identification process now estimates the signal amplitude of each and every individual embedded code signal (as opposed to taking the cross-correlation result of step 12, FIG. 3). If our identification signal exists in the suspect picture, the amplitudes thus found will split into a polarity with positive amplitudes being assigned a `1` and negative amplitudes being assigned a `1`. Our unique identification code manifests itself. If, on the other hand, no such identification code exists or it is someone else's code, then a random gaussian-like distribution of amplitudes is found with a random hash of values.

It remains to provide a few more details on how the amplitudes of the individual embedded codes are found. Again, fortunately, this exact problem has been treated in other technological applications. Besides, throw this problem and a little food into a crowded room of mathematicians and statisticians and surely a half dozen optimized methodologies will pop out after some reasonable period of time. It is a rather cleanly defined problem.

One specific example solution comes from the field of astronomical imaging. Here, it is a mature prior art to subtract out a "thermal noise frame" from a given CCD image of an object. Often, however, it is not precisely known what scaling factor to use in subtracting the thermal frame, and a search for the correct scaling factor is performed. This is precisely the task of this step of the present embodiment.

General practice merely performs a common search algorithm on the scaling factor, where a scaling factor is chosen and a new image is created according to:

The new image is applied to the fast fourier transform routine and a scale factor is eventually found which minimizes the integrated high frequency content of the new image. This general type of search operation with its minimization of a particular quantity is exceedingly common. The scale factor thus found is the sought-for "amplitude." Refinements which are contemplated but not yet implemented are where the coupling of the higher derivatives of the acquired image and the embedded codes are estimated and removed from the calculated scale factor. In other words, certain bias effects from the coupling mentioned earlier are present and should be eventually accounted for and removed both through theoretical and empirical experimentation.

Use and Improvements in the Detection of Signal or Image Alteration

Apart from the basic need of identifying a signal or image as a whole, there is also a rather ubiquitous need to detect possible alterations to a signal or image. The following section describes how the foregoing embodiment, with certain modifications and improvements, can be used as a powerful tool in this area. The potential scenarios and applications of detecting alterations are innumerable.

To first summarize, assume that we have a given signal or image which has been positively identified using the basic methods outlined above. In other words, we know its N-bit identification word, its individual embedded code signals, and its composite embedded code. We can then fairly simply create a spatial map of the composite code's amplitude within our given signal or image. Furthermore, we can divide this amplitude map by the known composite code's spatial amplitude, giving a normalized map, i.e. a map which should fluctuate about some global mean value. By simple examination of this map, we can visually detect any areas which have been significantly altered wherein the value of the normalized amplitude dips below some statistically set threshold based purely on typical noise and corruption (error).

The details of implementing the creation of the amplitude map have a variety of choices. One is to perform the same procedure which is used to determine the signal amplitude as described above, only now we step and repeat the multiplication of any given area of the signal/image with a gaussian weight function centered about the area we are investigating.

Universal Versus Custom Codes

The disclosure thus far has outlined how each and every source signal has its own unique set of individual embedded code signals. This entails the storage of a significant amount of additional code information above and beyond the original, and many applications may merit some form of economizing.

One such approach to economizing is to have a given set of individual embedded code signals be common to a batch of source materials. For example, one thousand images can all utilize the same basic set of individual embedded code signals. The storage requirements of these codes then become a small fraction of the overall storage requirements of the source material.

Furthermore, some applications can utilize a universal set of individual embedded code signals, i.e., codes which remain the same for all instances of distributed material. This type of requirement would be seen by systems which wish to hide the N-bit identification word itself, yet have standardized equipment be able to read that word. This can be used in systems which make go/no go decisions at point-of-read locations. The potential drawback to this set-up is that the universal codes are more prone to be sleuthed or stolen; therefore they will not be as secure as the apparatus and methodology of the previously disclosed arrangement. Perhaps this is just the difference between `high security` and `air-tight security,` a distinction carrying little weight with the bulk of potential applications.

Use in Printing, Paper. Documents, Plastic Coated Identification Cards, and Other Material Where Global Embedded Codes Can Be Imprinted

The term `signal` is often used narrowly to refer to digital data information, audio signals, images, etc. A broader interpretation of `signal,` and the one more generally intended, includes any form of modulation of any material whatsoever. Thus, the micro-topology of a piece of common paper becomes a `signal` (e.g. it height as a function of x-y coordinates). The reflective properties of a flat piece of plastic (as a function of space also) becomes a signal. The point is that photographic emulsions, audio signals, and digitized information are not the only types of signals capable of utilizing the principles described herein.

As a case in point, a machine very much resembling a braille printing machine can be designed so as to imprint unique `noise-like` indentations as outlined above. These indentations can be applied with a pressure which is much smaller than is typically applied in creating braille, to the point where the patterns are not noticed by a normal user of the paper. But by following the steps of the present disclosure and applying them via the mechanism of micro-indentations, a unique identification code can be placed onto any given sheet of paper, be it intended for everyday stationary purposes, or be it for important documents, legal tender, or other secured material.

The reading of the identification material in such an embodiment generally proceeds by merely reading the document optically at a variety of angles. This would become an inexpensive method for deducing the micro-topology of the paper surface. Certainly other forms of reading the topology of the paper are possible as well.

In the case of plastic encased material such as identification cards, e.g. driver's licenses, a similar braille-like impressions machine can be utilized to imprint unique identification codes. Subtle layers of photoreactive materials can also be embedded inside the plastic and `exposed.`

It is clear that wherever a material exists which is capable of being modulated by `noise-like` signals, that material is an appropriate carrier for unique identification codes and utilization of the principles disclosed herein. All that remains is the matter of economically applying the identification information and maintaining the signal level below an acceptability threshold which each and every application will define for itself.

Real Time Encoder

While the first class of embodiments most commonly employs a standard microprocessor or computer to perform the encodation of an image or signal, it is possible to utilize a custom encodation device which may be faster than a typical Von Neuman-type processor. Such a system can be utilized with all manner of serial data streams.

Music and videotape recordings are examples of serial data streams--data streams which are often pirated. It would assist enforcement efforts if authorized recordings were encoded with identification data so that pirated knock-offs could be traced to the original from which they were made.

Piracy is but one concern driving the need for applicant's technology. Another is authentication. Often it is important to confirm that a given set of data is really what it is purported to be (often several years after its generation).

To address these and other needs, the system 200 of FIG. 5 can be employed. System 200 can be thought of as an identification coding black box 202. The system 200 receives an input signal (sometimes termed the "master" or "unencoded" signal) and a code word, and produces (generally in real time) an identification-coded output signal. (Usually, the system provides key data for use in later decoding.)

The contents of the "black box" 202 can take various forms. An exemplary black box system is shown in FIG. 6 and includes a look-up table 204, a digital noise source 206, first and second scalers 208, 210, an adder/subtracter 212, a memory 214, and a register 216.

The input signal (which in the illustrated embodiment is an 8-20 bit data signal provided at a rate of one million samples per second, but which in other embodiments could be an analog signal if appropriate A/D and D/A conversion is provided) is applied from an input 218 to the address input 220 of the look-up table 204. For each input sample (i.e. look-up table address), the table provides a corresponding 8-bit digital output word. This output word is used as a scaling factor that is applied to one input of the first scaler 208.

The first scaler 208 has a second input, to which is applied an 8-bit digital noise signal from source 206. (In the illustrated embodiment, the noise source 206 comprises an analog noise source 222 and an analog-to-digital converter 224
although, again, other implementations can be used.) The noise source in the illustrated embodiment has a zero mean output value, with a full width half maximum (FWHM) of 50-100 digital numbers (e.g. from -75 to +75).

The first scaler 208 multiplies the two 8-bit words at its inputs (scale factor and noise) to produce--for each sample of the system input signal--a 16-bit output word. Since the noise signal has a zero mean value, the output of the first scaler likewise has a zero mean value.

The output of the first scaler 208 is applied to the input of the second scaler 210. The second scaler serves a global scaling function, establishing the absolute magnitude of the identification signal that will ultimately be embedded into the input data signal. The scaling factor is set through a scale control device 226 (which may take a number of forms, from a simple rheostat to a graphically implemented control in a graphical user interface), permitting this factor to be changed in accordance with the requirements of different applications. The second scaler 210 provides on its output line 228 a scaled noise signal. Each sample of this scaled noise signal is successively stored in the memory 214.

(In the illustrated embodiment, the output from the first scaler 208 may range between -1500 and +1500 (decimal), while the output from the second scaler 210 is in the low single digits, (such as between -2 and +2).)

Register 216 stores a multi-bit identification code word. In the illustrated embodiment this code word consists of 8 bits, although larger code words (up to hundreds of bits) are commonly used. These bits are referenced, one at a time, to control how the input signal is modulated with the scaled noise signal.

In particular, a pointer 230 is cycled sequentially through the bit positions of the code word in register 216 to provide a control bit of "0" or "1" to a control input 232 of the adder/subtracter 212. If, for a particular input signal sample, the control bit is a "1", the scaled noise signal sample on line 32 is added to the input signal sample. If the control bit is a "0", the scaled noise signal sample is subtracted from the input signal sample. The output 234 from the adder/subtracter
212 provides the black box's output signal.

The addition or subtraction of the scaled noise signal in accordance with the bits of the code word effects a modulation of the input signal that is generally imperceptible. However, with knowledge of the contents of the memory 214, a user can later decode the encoding, determining the code number used in the original encoding process. (Actually, use of memory 214 is optional, as explained below.)

It will be recognized that the encoded signal can be distributed in well known ways, including converted to printed image form, stored on magnetic media (floppy diskette, analog or DAT tape, etc.), CD-ROM, etc. etc.

Decoding

A variety of techniques can be used t